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LASSITER V DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES: DUE PROCESS
TAKES AN AD HOC TURN-WHAT'S A
PARENT TO

Do?

INTRODUCTION

In the recent Supreme Court decision, Lasslter v. Department of Social Services,' the majority, by a vote of five to four, held that there is noperse constitutional requirement that counsel be appointed for indigents in parental
status termination proceedings. 2 The Court left the question whether due
process requires the appointment of counsel to the determination of the trial
3
court, subject to appellate review.
This comment will examine the evolution of the procedural due process
right of indigent litigants to appointed counsel, and will briefly discuss the
Court's holding in Lassier. The majority's rationale will be analyzed in
depth with an exploration of the potential ramifications of the decision. Finally, there will be consideration of equal protection, which the Lassiter
Court failed to address, as an alternate source of the right to counsel.
I.

FACTS OF THE CASE

On May 23, 1975, a state court in North Carolina determined that Ms.
Abby Lassiter's son, William, was a neglected child, based on evidence that
she had not provided him with adequate medical care. 4 At that time, the
Durham County Department of Social Services (Department) gained custody of William. A year later, Ms. Lassiter was convicted of second-degree
murder with a twenty-five-to-forty-year sentence. 5
In the spring of 1978, the Department filed a petition to terminate Ms.
Lassiter's parental rights with respect to William.6 Subsequently, Ms.
Lassiter was served with the petition in prison, and received notice and a
7
summons, which she failed to answer.
The attorney representing the Department requested that Ms. Lassiter
be brought to the hearing on August 31, 1978. Before taking testimony at
the hearing, the court discussed Ms. Lassiter's lack of legal representation. 8
It was disclosed that although she had apparently informed several prison
officials of her pending termination hearing, she had received no advice of
her right to counsel, nor was any action taken to help her secure representa1. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
2. Id at 31.
3. d at 31-32.
4. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2, In re Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (Juvenile Petition) [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix].

5. Id at 5 (Order Terminating Parental Rights).
6. Id. at 2-4 (Juvenile Petition).
7. Id at 16 (Exception to Record on Appeal, Narrative of Testimony).
8. Petitioner's Answer Brief for Certiorari, IV at 3-9, In re Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18 (1981)
(Transcript of Evidence) [hereinafter cited as Appendix IV].
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tion. 9 While in prison, Abby Lassiter's mother retained counsel for an appeal of her daughter's murder conviction. However, Abby did not discuss
the proceeding to terminate her parental rights with that attorney.10
The court concluded that Ms. Lassiter had had sufficient opportunity to
obtain counsel prior to the hearing and nonetheless had failed to do so.II
Therefore, the hearing proceeded without appointment of counsel. She was
allowed to cross-examine and testify on her own behalf.' 2 The court terminated Ms. Lassiter's status as William's parent based on a finding of her
13
infrequent contact with, and lack of demonstrated concern for, her son.
On appeal, Ms. Lassiter claimed that due to her indigency, the trial court
erred in not appointing counsel for her in violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.' 4 On November 6, 1979, the North Carolina Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed
the judgment of the district court. Individual privacy was held to be a fundamental right; however, termination of parental status was found not to
interfere with individual privacy sufficiently to require the appointment of
counsel.1 5 On January 17, 1980, the Supreme Court of North Carolina sum6
marily denied Ms. Lassiter's application for discretionary review. '
After granting certiorari, 17 the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the North Carolina decisions, holding that the Constitution does not mandate the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental status
termination proceeding.' 8 Nevertheless, the trial court, subject to appellate
review, may decide on a case-by-case basis whether due process requires the
appointment of counsel.19
9. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 16 (Exception to Record on Appeal, Narrative of
Testimony).
10. Id at II (Affidavit of T. F. Loflin). The attorney representing Ms. Lassiter for the
appeal of her murder conviction, Mr. Loflin, indicated that had Ms. Lassiter asked him to
represent her in the parental rights termination proceeding, he would have been unwilling to do
so because of her indigent status.
11. Id at 16 (Exception to Record on Appeal, Narrative of Testimony).
12. Appendix IV, supra note 8, at 19-42 (Transcript of Evidence).
13. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 5 (Order Terminating Parental Rights at 1). The
termination order quoted from the N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32 (1981) which states the
grounds for terminating parental rights as of August 31, 1978--the date of Ms. Lassiter's hearing. The instant termination order was based on the following two grounds as stated in § 7A289.32(1) and (3) (1977):
(1) The parent has without cause failed to establish or maintain concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare. (repealed 1979).
(3) The parent has willfully left the child in foster care for more than two consecu-

tive years without showing to the satisfaction of the court that substantial progress has
been made within two years in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of
the child for neglect, or without showing positive response within two years to the
diligent efforts of a county department of social services . . . to encourage the parent
to strengthen the parental relationship to the child or to make and follow through
with constructive planning for the future of the child.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 15 (Assignment of Error).
In re Lassiter, 43 N.C. App. 525, 259 S.E.2d 336 (1979).
In re Lassiter, 299 N.C. 120, 262 S.E.2d 6 (1980).
449 U.S. 819 (1980).
452 U.S. at 31.
Id at 31-32.
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

The due process safeguards embodied in the fifth 20 and fourteenth 2'
amendments arose from an historical recognition of the need for institutional
22
checks to protect individual freedom from arbitrary government action.
The value society places on different rights and freedoms has evolved, as
have the governmental challenges to those rights. Therefore, the courts have
been faced with the task of delineating the contours of due process in a way
that provides both flexibility and guidance.
A.

The Right to Counsel in the Cnminal Context

One facet of procedural due process, an accused's right to counsel in a
federal court, is explicitly guaranteed by the sixth amendment. 23 In 1932,
Powell v. Alabama 24 required the appointment of counsel in all capital cases.
However, for many years after the Powell decision, there was no per se right
to appointed counsel in non-capital cases. If, in a particular case, the court
determined that lack of counsel produced unfairness, then an attorney was
appointed. This process became known as the "special circumstances" rule
of Bets v. Brady.25 The Betts rule was based on the view that the right to
counsel conferred by the sixth amendment was not a fundamental right and
therefore was not binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment.
During the next few decades this flexible, case-by-case approach to due process caused some confusion and resulted in the reversal of many state convictions. 26 Finally, Betts was overruled in Gideon v. Wainwnght, 27 which
established an absolute right to counsel in all felony cases. Justice Black,
writing for the majority, emphasized that due to the fundamental character
of the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, a state would not have the
28
prerogative to decide on an ad hoc basis whether to insure this right.
Argersinger v. Ham'ln 29 further extended this principle, holding that no one
can be imprisoned for any petty, misdemeanor, or felony offense without
representation by counsel, unless there is a knowing and intelligent waiver of
the right. 30 This right was limited later in Scott v. Illinois,3 ' which held the
right to counsel to be constitutionally mandated only when imprisonment is
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1 specifies that: "No person shall ...
"
liberty or property, without due process of law ....

be deprived of life,

21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states in part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person
"
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
22. See generaly Kadish, Methodology and Criteriain Due Process Adjidiation-A Survey and Cnticijm, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 340 (1957).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, § 1 states in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
24. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
25. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
26. Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258, 264 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
27. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
28. Id at 344.
29. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
30. Id at 37.
31. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
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32

The Right to Counsel in Cld Cases

Although the Supreme Court has often expressed the view that the
"right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel,"' 33 no single rule has developed
concerning the right to counsel in civil proceedings. Instead, the Court has
focused on the flexibility of due process and the necessity of considering the
particularities in a given context. 34 Although the Court is not always explicit or consistent in its analytic approach to procedural due process issues,
a two-tiered analysis is useful in understanding these cases. The first tier
involves the question of whether some fundamental "life", "liberty", or
"property" interest has been infringed by government action. If so, the sec35
ond level of analysis determines what process is due.
When the infringed fundamental right is considered to be one of substantial importance, such as personal freedom, the Court has questioned the
usefulness of the civil/criminal distinction. In Specht v. Patterson,36 the Court
held that individuals facing commitment as sex offenders are entitled to
counsel despite the fact that the proceedings are technically civil. 37 The
Supreme Court likewise held in the case of In re Gault38 that children must be
provided with counsel in civil proceedings to determine delinquency. Such
juvenile litigants need "the guiding hand of counsel" 39 to deal with
problems of law, prepare and submit an effective defense, inquire into the
40
facts, and insist upon adherence to procedural and evidentiary rules.
Once a fundamental right is threatened, the second tier of analysis usually involves the Court's recognition that the procedural safeguards required
in a given context depend on the interests at stake and the nature of the
4
governmental proceedings. Gagnon v. Scarpeli"
involved a due process analysis of probation revocation hearings which were found to be analogous to
the parole revocation hearings in Morr'sse v. Brewer. 4 2 The private interest
at stake in both cases was held to be a conditional liberty interest because it
depended on the observance of certain restrictions. 43 In assessing the process
due in Gagnon, the Court focused primarily on the rehabilitative, 44 infor32. Id at 373.
33. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,

68-69 (1932)).
34. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
35. J. NOWAK, R.

ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 477 (1978).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

386 U.S. 605 (1967).
Id at 608.
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 36 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
Id at *36.
411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
411 U.S. at 781.
44. F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. KIMBALL, M. MELLI & H. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION, MATERIALS AND CASES 910-11 (1969).
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ma145 and discretionary, 46 nature of the proceedings.47 The Court concluded that the state is not under a constitutional duty to provide counsel for
48
indigents in probation (parole) revocation hearings.
A decision as to the need for counsel may be made on a case-by-case
basis in which there is special consideration'given to the probationer's (parolee's) ability to speak effectively for himself.49 In Wooffv. McDonnell,5 0 the
Court held that inmates do not have a constitutional right to appointed
counsel in prison disciplinary proceedings. However, the Court stressed that
inmates should have the right to seek free aid when they are illiterate or the
51
issues are complex.
Outside the area of prisoners' rights, the Court also declined to find a
constitutional mandate to appoint counsel in Goss v. Lopez, 52 which involved
school disciplinary proceedings. The Court considered the brief, informal
and educational nature of the proceedings to be significant. 53 In the more
recent decision of Parham v. J.R.,54 the Court balanced individual, family,
and social interests in concluding there is no right to a formal adversary
hearing or counsel when parents seek to commit their children to state
mental institutions.5 5 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated
that parents have a substantial role in deciding their child's treatment, but
that such parental authority is not absolute. Furthermore, he emphasized
56
that the issues were essentially medical and informal in nature.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, 5 7 the Court developed a general balancing
formula which has become the standard mode of analysis for resolving the
second tier issue of which procedures are appropriate in a particular context.
The formula requires a weighing of the private interest infringed, the risk
that the government's decisionmaking procedure will yield erroneous results,
and the countervailing state interest in the challenged procedure. 58 Unlike
45. 411 U.S. at 786-87 stating, in part, that members of the neutral and detached hearing
body need not be judicial officers or lawyers and that the technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not used at such proceedings.
46. Id. at 784 n.8: "[I]n the sample studied, probation or parole was revoked in only 34.5%
of the cases in which the probationer or parolee violated the terms of his release." (citing S.
HUNT, THE REVOCATION DECISION: A STUDY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE AGENTS' DISCRE-

TION 10 (unpublished thesis in University of Wisconsin library) (1964) (cited in Brief for Petitioner, Addendum 106).
47. 411 U.S. at 783-88.
48. Id. at 790.
49. Id at 791.
50. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id at 570.
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Id at 583.
442 U.S. 584 (1979).
Id. at 604-09.
Id at 591.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id at 335. The three elements of the balancing test are:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk

of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the

probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
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the landmark case of Goldberg v. Ke/y, 5 9 in which the Court held that the
state could not terminate public assistance benefits to a recipient without
affording him the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination, 60 the Eldridge Court held that pretermination evidentiary hearings were
not required in the context of disability benefits. 6 1 The Court distinguished
Goldberg, stating that it involved an income maintenance scheme for those in
financial need, whereas the Social Security disability system in Eldridge made
62
payments to the disabled irrespective of financial need.

One of the Court's most recent decisions involving the right to counsel
in civil proceedings was Vtek v.Jones. 6 3 The Court held that the involuntary
transfer of a state prisoner to a mental hospital implicates a liberty interest
that is protected by the due process clause. 64 The case is noteworthy in that
the infringed liberty interest was not strictly a loss of personal freedom, since
the prisoner was involuntarily confined in both the prison and the mental
hospital. Nevertheless, confinement to a mental hospital was found to require additional procedural protections for the prisoner because of the compelled therapeutic treatment 65 and stigma associated with such a transfer. 66
After applying the Eldr'dge balancing formula, four of the five Justices who
reached the merits considered the deprivation of liberty and the limited
mental capacity of the prisoner as justifying the right to counsel. 67 The fifth
Justice stated that due process would be satisfied if the prisoner were provided with qualified and independent assistance-not necessarily by a li68
censed attorney.
C.

The Liberty Interest in Family Integrity'

The first Supreme Court case to acknowledge the right to the integrity
of the family was Meyer o. Nebraska.69 Justice McReynolds, writing for the
majority, stated that "liberty" as used in the due process clause "denotes, not
merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right. . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children."' 70 Utilizing this broad definition of "liberty", the Court proceeded to invalidate a state law which prohibited the
71
teaching of foreign languages to young children.
Two years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 72 Justice McReynolds developed the theme previously introduced in Meyer. Pierce sustained a challenge
by private schools to the state law which required children to attend public
59.
60.
61.
62.

397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Id at 266.
424 U.S. at 340.
Id at 340-41.

63. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id at 488.
Id
Id at 492.
Id at 496-97.
Id at 497-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Id at 399.
Id at 402.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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schools. 73 The Court reasoned that the statute "unreasonably interferes with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing . . . of [their]
children." 74 Later the Court, in Prince v. Massachu.retts,75 reiterated the fundamental role and freedom that parents have in the care of their children.
76
This freedom creates a private sphere into which the state cannot intrude.
77
In May v. Anderson, the Court referred to a mother's custody right in her
child as "rights far more precious to appellant than property rights . . . . 7
The 1972 Supreme Court case of Stanley v. Illinot's79 utilized both a due
process and equal protection analysis in holding unconstitutional an irrebuttable statutory presumption that all unwed fathers are unfit to have custody
of their children. 80 The Court stressed that the rights to conceive and raise
one's children are "essential" 81 and "basic civil rights of man,"'8 2 which are
recognized by the law regardless of whether the parents are married. Such
rights are deemed to be fundamental and therefore invoke the strict scrutiny
test associated with the equal protection clause.8 3 The Stanley majority
noted that the fundamental right to family integrity is derived from the due
86
85
process8 4 and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
III.

LASSITER V DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, discussed prior cases dealing
with the due process right to counsel,8 7 and then examined parental status
termination proceedings in light of the Eldridge balancing formula.8 8 In
terms of precedent, the Court cited the early criminal cases which helped
establish an accused's right to counsel when actual imprisonment is
threatened.8 9 Next, there was an examination of civil cases, 9° in which the
73. Id at 517.
74. Id at 513.
75. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).

76. Id at 166. The Court stated:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder . . . [a]nd it is in recognition of this that [Meyer
and Pierce] have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
M.
77. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
78. Id at 533.
79. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
80. Id at 649.
81. Id at 651 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
82. Id at 651 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
83. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The Skinner decision was one of the
first Supreme Court cases to exercise strict scrutiny in favor of a 'basic liberty' not explicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that
"[mlarriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id
The majority elaborated upon this equal protection argument by emphasizing that infringement of fundamental rights triggers the Court's strict scrutiny of state classifications.
84. 405 U.S. at 651 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
85. 405 U.S. at 651 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
86. 405 U.S. at 651 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965)).
87. 452 U.S. at 25-27.
88. Id. at 27-32.
89. Id at 25 (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)). Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)).
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majority argued that the primary determinant of the right to counsel is the
potential loss of personal freedom. 9 ' The Court concluded the "precedents
speak with one voice" that there is a "presumption" due process does not
require that an indigent have a right to appointed counsel unless he may be
deprived of his physical liberty. The results of the Eldridge balancing
92
formula must be weighed against this presumption.
In applying the three-pronged Eldridge analysis, the majority found the
following interests. First, a parent's interest in a just and accurate parental
status decision is a "commanding one," especially if there is potential criminal liability. Second, the state shares with the parent an interest in correct
decisions and has an interst in informal procedures, in some cases. However,
the state's economic interest is relatively weak. Third, the Court held there
may be an "insupportably high" risk of an erroneous deprivation of parental
rights where the uncounseled parent is incapable of handling complex
93
proceedings.
The majority acknowledged that the "courts have generally held that
the state must appoint counsel for indigent parents at termination proceedings." 94 The Court also stated that the Department of Social Services had
no precedent for its policy denying appointed counsel to indigent parents,
95
except the North Carolina opinion in the instant case.
Justice Stewart stated that the presumption could be overcome only if
the Eldridge factors were balanced such that the parent's interest and the risk
of an erroneous decision were at their highest level and the state's interest
was at its lowest level. 96 Reasoning that such a balance would not always
occur, the Court concluded there was no constitutional mandate for the appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding. The issue
whether due process requires the appointment of counsel in a given case
97
The
could then be decided by the trial court, subject to appellate review.
majority pointed out in closing that, although the Constitution does not
mandate the appointment of counsel in all termination proceedings, enlight98
ened public policy may and often has required higher standards.

IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY'S RATIONALE

Significant portions of the majority's rationale involve a balanced examination of the competing views. However, at several crucial junctures,
the majority made questionable assertions upon which it based its subsequent argument. The following analysis will focus on these assertions.
90. 452 U.S. at 25-26 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367 (1979); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
91. 452 U.S. at 25-27.
92. Id at 27.
93. Id at 31.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

d
Id
d
d
Id

at
at
at
at
at

30.
30-31.
31.
31-32.
33.
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The Presumption that the "Precedents Speak With One Voice"

Justice Blackmun's comprehensive dissent in Lassiter rejected the majority's notion that legal precedent supports a "presumption" that the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel only when physical liberty is
infringed. 99 He further stated that "incarceration has been found to be
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for requiring counsel on behalf
of an indigent defendant."' °
The majority's presumption is an accurate reflection of the right to
counsel in criminal cases. In elucidating the sixth amendment's mandate
that an accused should be afforded the right to counsel, the Court has found
it necessary to define this constitutional right by drawing the line at actual
imprisonment. 101

However, strict extrapolation of this premise to civil cases is not justified. The fifth and fourteenth amendments state that fundamental rights
may not be abridged without due process, but do not specify the requisites of
that process.' 0 2 Thus, ascertainment of due process requires an analytic ap03
proach sensitive to the variables in the civil arena.'
A closer examination of several of the civil cases cited by Justice Stewart
reveals important distinctions which he failed to address. He relied heavily
on Gagnon v. Scarpe/i' ° 4 as precedent for the case-by-case approach to assessing due process rights in Lassiter,'05 without adequately distinguishing the
two cases. The probation revocation hearings in Gagnon were before a decisionmaker who was neither a judge nor an attorney. The hearing took place
without the technical rules of procedure and evidence. The primary purpose
of the Gagnon proceeding was rehabilitative, the state was not represented by
counsel, and the ultimate decision was discretionary.t°06 The presence of an
attorney at such a hearing is unnecessary and arguably counterproductive to
07
the extent that counsel introduces an undesirable adversarial edge.
In Lassiter, the parental termination proceedings were heard before a
judge, with the full panoply of procedural and evidentiary rules. The state
was represented by counsel. The result, though perhaps not the intent, was
punitive, and the court was required to make formal findings of fact and
conclusions of law.10 8 In such a formal, adversarial proceeding the parent's
ability to understand, let alone effectively utilize, the available legal mecha99. Id at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. Id
101. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), where the Court stated: "[W]e believe that the
central premise of Argersinger-thatactual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines
or the mere threat of imprisonment-is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel." Id at 373.
102. See notes 20, 21 supra.
103. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). "The
very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to
every imaginable situation." Id at 895.
104. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
105. 452 U.S. at 31-32.
106. 411 U.S. at 784-86.
107. Id at 787-88.
108. 452 U.S. at 42-44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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10 9
nisms is substantially impaired by the lack of representation.
11
in support of its presumption. 1 1
The majority also cited Vitek v. Jones
However, loss of physical liberty was not the determinative factor in Viek,
2
which involved a transfer from a prison to a mental hospital. 1' Four of the
five Justices who reached the merits held there is aperse constitutional right
to appointed counsel because of the diminished capacity of the prisoner to
present his case, the stigmatizing effect of the transfer, and the compulsory
therapy. 113

If the "precedents speak with one voice," the message is mumbled. The
majority's presumption does not adequately explain why there was no right
to counsel in Gagnon 114 when there was the prospect of deprivation of personal liberty through revocation of probation, whereas four of the Justices in
Mtek11 5 held there was a right to counsel when personal freedom was not the
major issue.
Lassiter also establishes a potentially dangerous precedent through its
implicit value judgment that incarceration, even for a brief period of time, is
a more grievous loss than the complete and irrevocable termination of a parent's right to her child.1 16 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun argued that the
majority's presumption "grafts an unnecessary and burdensome new layer of
' ' 7
Lassiter does not
analysis onto its traditional three-factor balancing test."
rest squarely on precedent and lacks predictive value.
B.

On'gins and Eects of the Case-by-Case Approach

Justices Stewart's and Blackmun's application of the Mathews v. Eldridge
balancing test is surprisingly similar, despite their contrary conclusions.
Both Justices acknowledged the fundamental importance of a parent's interest in the care and custody of his or her child," 8 and the "unique kind of
deprivation""' 9 that results from the irrevocable termination of parental status. The majority and Justice Blackmun agreed that parents and the state
109. The inadequacy ofpro se representation is further augmented by the fact that, like Ms.
Lassiter, most parents in termination proceedings are poor and uneducated. See Schetky, Angell, Morrison & Sack, Parents Who Fail: A Study of.51 Cases of Temination ofParentalRights, 18 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCH. 366, 381 (1979) (describing the typical parent involved in a termination proceeding as being at an educational, economic, social, and emotional disadvantage). A
recent North Carolina study of parents of foster children, who are the same group of parents
involved in termination proceedings, shows that such parents have an average educational level
of the eighth grade, an average income of $6,000 for a family of four, and are generally unemployed or working as unskilled labor. GOVERNOR'S ADVOCACY COUNCIL ON CHILDREN AND
YOUTH, WHY CAN'T I HAVE A HOME?: A REPORT ON FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION IN
NORTH CAROLINA 16-17 (Dec. 1978).
110. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
111. 452 U.S. at 25.
112. 445 U.S. at 494.
113. Id at 496-97.
114. 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973).
115. 445 U.S. at 496-97.
116. Brief for Amicus Curiae National Legal Aid and Defender Association, No. 79-6423 at
20, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
117. 452 U.S. at 41 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. Id at 27, 35-42.
119. Id at 27, 40.
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share an interest in accurate and just adjudication, 120 that the state has a
legitimate role in protecting the child's welfare,' 2 1 and that the government
has minimal pecuniary interests.' 22 Although Justice Blackmun's discussion
of the risk of an erroneous decision is more thorough and emphatic, 123 both
he and Justice Stewart note the potential for complicated issues and the
parent will have in effectively participatprobable difficulty the uncounseled
124
ing in a termination proceeding.
On balance, the two opinions are similar in their Eldridge analysis and
appear to weigh decisively in favor of the indigent parent's right to appointed counsel. However, the majority then stated that since the three factors "will not always be so distributed," the Constitution should not be read
to require "the appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding."' 125 This statement represents the illogical bridge between the Eldridge balancing analysis and the majority's final rejection of a per se
constitutional right to counsel. The strength of the holding in Lassiter depends to a great extent on the structural soundness of this bridge.
The "bridge" is flawed in several respects. First, the majority departs
from due process precedent by focusing on the individual litigant rather
than establishing a general rule within a given context. This contradicts the
principle espoused in Eldridge that "procedural due process rules are shaped
by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the
generality of cases, not the rare exceptions." 126 In the Eldridge case, for example, the Court extracted the generic components of the balancing test
from the particular context of Social Security disability benefits. As a result
of that analysis, the Court then expressed the general rule that an eviden127
tiary hearing is not required prior to termination of disability benefits.
A second and related flaw in Lassiter stemming from the majority's failure to enunciate a general rule is the resulting inconsistency in due process
doctrine and its application. 128 The Lassiter amalgamation of the Eldridge
balancing test with the rebuttable presumption detracts from the judicial
ideal of predictability.
Third, the Lassiter approach is simply impractical. An ad hoc method of
determining the right to appointed counsel is riddled with problems, as illustrated by the consequences of the Betlts v. Brady '2 9 decision. For two decades
following Betts, there was confusion and a multitude of post-verdict challenges. 130 Finally, Belts proved so unworkable that it was overruled by
120. Id at 27, 31, 47-48.
121. Id at 27, 47-49.
122. Id. at 28, 31, 48.
123. Id. at 41-47.
124. Id at 30-32, 41-47.
125. Id. at 31.
126. 424 U.S. at 344.
127. Id at 340.
128. See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calcuus for Administrative Adjiudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search ofa Theog; of Value, 44 U. CHi. L. REV. 28, 28-29 (1976)
(expressing need for general criteria to provide consistency and to minimize need for judicial
testing of each procedure).
129. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

130. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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Gideon v. Wainwright. 13 1 In his concurring opinion in Gideon, Justice Harlan
commented that in application, the Betts ad hoc approach was no longer a
reality because the Supreme Court had found "special circumstances" justi13 2
fying reversal for lack of counsel in most of the challenged cases.
The increased federal court interference with lower court decisions results in a concomitant augmentation of the burden placed on the trial
court.1 33 The majority opinion in Lassiter requires the trial judge to assess

whether an attorney will make a determinative difference-before the hear34
ing takes place.'
The inherent risks in such an approach are vividly highlighted in Ms.
Lassiter's hearing. The trial judge considered and rejected Ms. Lassiter's
need for counsel before taking testimony.1 35 Much of the evidence, which
was subsequently admitted against Ms. Lassiter, was hearsay based upon
social welfare records that were never authenticated or qualified as business
record exceptions to the hearsay rule. 136 Without the aid of counsel, Ms.
Lassiter's "cross-examination" was an empty ritual. 137 Her testimony was
primarily delivered in response to leading questions from the court, and on
several occasions the judge displayed impatience1 38 and disbelief 1 39 at Ms.
Lassiter's answers.
The Supreme Court, after announcing the ad hoc approach to the appointment of counsel, proceeded to evaluate Ms. Lassiter's case. 140 The majority held that the trial court's failure to appoint counsel was not a violation
of due process largely because there were no criminal charges, expert witnesses, or complicated issues of law.' 4 ' Justice Stewart reasoned that given
the weight of authority, an attorney would not have made a determinative
difference even though the state was represented by counsel, hearsay evidence was admitted, and Ms. Lassiter did not develop several potential defenses. 14 2 In addition, the majority would allow the trial court to consider a
131. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
132. Id at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).
133. 452 U.S. at 51 n.19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134. d at 31-32.
135. Appendix IV, supra note 8, at 3-9 (Transcript of Evidence).
136. Id at 10-18.
137. Id at 19-24 (Ms. Lassiter made 27 statements during her "cross-examination" of which
only two were questions. The remaining statements were dismissed by the judge as being improperly declarative).
138. Id at 52, where the judge said in response to Ms. Lassiter's mother's answers to his
questions, "I tell you what, let's just stop all this. You [attorney for the Department of Social
Services] question her, please. Just answer his questions. We'll be here all day at this rate. I
mean, we are just wasting time, we're skipping from one subject to another."
139. Id at 30, where the judge asked Ms. Lassiter if she knew her mother had filed a complaint. When Ms. Lassiter responded in the negative, the judge said, "That was some ghost who

came up here and filed it I suppose."
140. 452 U.S. at 32-33.
141. Id at 32.
142. Id at 32-33. See also note 13 supra (which quotes the applicable charges against Ms.
Lassiter). There were possible defenses that Ms. Lassiter failed to develop. She could have
argued that the Department had not made "diligent efforts" to help her reestablish an interest
in her son, especially considering her lack of access to William because of her incarceration. Ms.
Lassiter could have claimed that she had a "constructive plan" for William's future as demonstrated by her arrangement with William's grandmother to care for him. Furthermore, the
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litigant's lack of interest in attending a prior hearing as one factor in evaluating due process.

143

This analysis sets a dangerous precedent. Ms. Lassiter's status as a parent might have been terminated even if she had been represented by counsel.
Nevertheless, due process should not pivot on a judicial guess as to the outcome of a case. In addition, by considering a litigant's lack of interest in
attending a hearing, there is a risk of allowing character judgments to influence the determination of whether a litigant has a constitutional right to
appointed counsel. Instead, the essential question of due process should be
founded on an inquiry into whether there has been fundamental "fairness"'

44

145
and a "meaningful opportunity to be heard."'

C. Do Liberty Interests Fit on the Eldridge Scales?
The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing formula originated in the context of
administrative and exparte quasi-judicial proceedings to determine due process requirements when property interests were in dispute.' 46 The tripartite
Eldridge test is suited for the comparison of such "quantifiable" factors as the
fiscal and administrative burdens on government and the value of statutory
property entitlements. The formula provides a "neutral" balancing mecha47
nism designed to insure the accurate implementation of laws.'
All of the Justices in Lassiter, except Justice Stevens, made the dubious
assumption that the Eldridge test is an appropriate method for balancing the
fundamental liberty interest in family integrity. 148 There are multiple risks
inherent in such an assumption.
First, liberty interests are not readily quantifiable and as such tend to be
undervalued in a balancing test. One commentator has suggested that, "[a]s
applied by the Eldridge Court the utilitarian calculus tends, as cost-benefit
analyses typically do, to 'dwarf soft variables' and to ignore complexities and
ambiguities."' 49 Justice Stevens wove this critical theme into his dissent by
noting that the majority appeared to treat Ms. Lassiter's deprivation as a
50
property interest, less deserving of protection than a liberty interest.'
Second, there are certain explicit and implicit constitutional rights that
are so fundamental to our concept of ordered liberty that care must be exercised to avoid balancing them away in a "neutral" test. In the case of Stanley
charge that Ms. Lassiter "willfully" and "without cause" left her son in foster care could have
been defended on the ground that during the majority of the two years in which William was in

foster care, Ms. Lassiter was in prison.
143. Id at 33.
144. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J.,concurring).
145. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). In Boddie the Court emphasized that,
"persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard." Id at 377.
146. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 668-69 (10th ed. 1980).
147. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-14 (1978).
148. 452 U.S. at 27. The majority avoided the property/liberty distinction by describing a
parent's interest in a termination proceeding as a "commanding one".
149. Mashaw, supra note 128, at 48.
150. 452 U.S. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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v. Illhnois,15 1 the Court characterized the due process clause as "designed to
protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy govern152
ment officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones."
Third, the cost-benefit trappings of the Eld'dge balancing formula create the seductive illusion that the analysis is objective. However, the values
placed on facts within the balancing framework are necessarily subjective.
Furthermore, as was demonstrated in Lassiter, different Justices may apply
similar values to the individual factors within the formula and yet reach
1 53
astonishingly disparate conclusions.
Fourth, the Eldr'dge balancing test creates a presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of government procedures. The judicial balancing outlined
in Eldridge duplicates, to a large extent, the process utilized by the legislature
or agency in formulating procedures. This presumption was explicitly stated
by Justice Powell in the majority opinion in Eldridge, which urged that "substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals
charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs that
the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitle5 4
ment claims of individuals."'
This criticism is not intended as a total indictment of the Eldridge balancing test. Balancing is an indispensable legal tool with which to consider
multiple, competing interests. With growing budgetary constraints, costbenefit analysis will become increasingly alluring. Just application of the
Eldridge balancing test will necessitate a continual awareness of, and compensation for, the propensity to dwarf liberty interests.
D. Has the Equal Protection Door Been Left Ajar?
Ms. Lassiter never raised the issue that the court's refusal to appoint
counsel at her termination proceeding was a violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment,' 55 thus precluding the Supreme Court
from considering that argument. 156 Use of the equal protection clause
would have fortified Ms. Lassiter's case and might have produced a different
result.
In the area of economic barriers to the judicial process, the Supreme
Court has been divided over whether to apply due process or equal protection analysis. The majority of justices have favored an equal protection approach. 157 The seminal case is Grjfi v. Iltnos, 15 8 in which it was held that
both due process and equal protection require that an indigent defendant
convicted of a felony be provided with a transcript or its equivalent on ap151. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
152. Id at 656.
153. See text accompanying notes 118-124 szpra.
154. 424 U.S. at 349.
155. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I states in part that, "No State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
156. 405 U.S. 658 n.10.
157. Se GUNTHER, supra note 146, at 938.
158. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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peal.1 59 There is no constitutional mandate that the states provide a right to
appellate review. 160 However once such a system of review has been created,
a state cannot discriminate against destitute defendants by limiting their opportunity for an adequate appellate review.1 6 1 There can be no equal justice
where "the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he
has."

162

The equal protection principles articulated in Grff were expanded in
Douglas v. Calfornia 163 which held that an indigent criminal defendant must
be given the assistance of counsel in a first appeal of right.' 64 Prior to the
decision in Douglas, California state appellate courts, upon request of an indigent for counsel, would review the transcript and determine whether appointed counsel would benefit either the defendant or the court. 6 5 This ad
hoc approach to determine the right to counsel was rejected in Douglas as
creating an invidious distinction based on wealth. 166 The opinion, which in
many respects foreshadowed Blackmun's dissent in Lassiter, criticized California's procedure as forcing a court to prejudge the merits before determining whether to appoint counsel. 167 Justice Douglas went on to say that
"[t]he indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only
the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful
appeal." 168
Both Griffin and Douglas applied equal protection analyses to defendants
convicted of felonies. However, in the subsequent case of Mayer v. City of
Chicago,169 the Supreme Court utilized the equal protection clause in-holding that an indigent criminal defendant convicted of a misdemeanor was
entitled to a free transcript on appeal, despite the fact that no jail sentence
was imposed. 170 In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized the importance of considering the impact of the state's action on the defendant, not
just the label attached to the action.1 7 1 "The size of the defendant's pocketbook bears no more relationship to his guilt or innocence in a nonfelony than
in a felony case."' 1 72 The majority in Mayer rejected the interpretation that
Gnffi balanced the interests of society with the needs of the accused,' 73 and
held that Griffin's principle "is a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would be available to others able to
159. Id at 19-20.
160. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). One author has questioned the current viability of McKane,"see Note, The Suprent Court 1962 Terrm, 77 HARv. L. REv. 79, 108 (1963).
161. 351 U.S. at 18.
162. Id at 19.
163. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
164. Id.at 357. But cf. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (which refused to extend an
indigent's right to appointed counsel in discretionary appeals).
165. Id at 355.
166. Id
167. Id. at 356.
168. Id.at 358.
169. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
170. Id.at 196-97.
171. Id.at 197.
172. Id at 196.
173. Id
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1 74
pay their own way."'
Gnffin and its progeny dealt with the rights of an accused on appeal.
Therefore, the issue of the requisite procedural rights arose after adjudication on the merits. In most of these cases, the defendants had the crucial
safeguards of representation by counsel and the presence of a jury during the
orginal trial. Indigent parents, by comparison, are denied theper se right to
appointed counsel from the beginning of their legal effort to maintain custody of their children. The relative importance -of a criminal appeal and a
civil trial can be deduced from the fact that there is no constitutional mandate for an appellate system.' 75 To suppose that the entire system of civil
76
trial courts is equally dispensable is incomprehensible.1

The equal protection analyses set forth in Gritji and its subsequent line
of cases are an appropriate legal framework within which to assess the rights
of parents in termination proceedings. First, parental termination proceedings bear many of the indicia of a criminal trial. 177 For example, in Ms.
Lassiter's case, the state initiated the proceeding and was represented by
counsel. Unlike an administrative hearing, Ms. Lassiter's case involved a
formal proceeding utilizing the technical rules of procedure and evidence
and was heard before a trialjudge. Furthermore, the judicial decision essentially branded Ms. Lassiter with the stigma of being an inadequate parent.
Second, the potential impact of the state's action is the devastating and
irrevocable severing of a parent's fundamental right to family integrity.' 78
The impairment of fundamental rights by the government invokes the
Court's strictest scrutiny.' 79 Unless there is a compelling state justification
for a wealth-based classification of parents in termination proceedings, the
government action is deemed unconstitutional. In Lassiter, the government's
minimal pecuniary interest in not providing court-appointed counsel is far
from compelling. '80
Third, the North Carolina statute, 18 1 which does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings, creates an invidious discrimination. The fourteenth amendment does not
require absolute equality.I8 2 However, when an indigent is denied the right
to appointed counsel, and this denial either is based on an "unreasoned distinction"'' 83 or results in fundamental unfairness,' 84 there is a violation of
the equal protection clause. The financial status of a parent is not rationally
related to the legal adequacy of that parent. Furthermore, there is data to
174. Id at 196-97.
175. See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
176. See Note, The Indi ent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545, 550 (1967).
177. See Catz & Kuelbs, The Requirementof Appointment of Counselfor Indient ParentsinNeglect or
Termination Proceedings." A Developing Area, 13 J. FAM. L. 223, 231 (1973).
178. See notes 69-86 supra and accompanying text.
179. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
180. 452 U.S. at 31. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
181. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.23 (1981). The only two instances in which indigent parents are entitled to court-appointed counsel are: parents under the age of 14 (effective Aug. 23,
1979) and parents with certain mental defects. Id
182. See Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
183. 404 U.S. at 193 (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966)).
184. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 162.

19821

LASSITER V DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

607

suggest that unrepresented parents are more likely than parents who are represented by counsel to lose custody of their children in neglect proceedings.18 5 "Since there is no evidence indicating that the average respondent
who can retain counsel is better or less neglectful than one who cannot, the
conclusion seems inescapable that a significant number of cases against unrepresented parents result in findings of neglect solely because of the absence
86
of counsel."'
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's five to four decision in Lassi'ter that indigent parents do not have aperse constitutional right to appointed counsel in termina-

tion proceedings is based on a novel amalgamation of tests. The results of
the Eldridge balancing formula were weighed against a presumption that litigants do not have a right to appointed counsel unless they are in danger of
losing their physical freedom as a result of the litigation. This presumption

does not follow from prior Supreme Court cases, and the combination of
tests sets a dangerous precedent. Lassiter places the Court in the position of
stating that imprisonment, even for several days, is a more grievous loss than
the irrevocable severance of a parent from his or her child.
Eight of the nine Justices applied the Eldridge balancing test in weighing
Ms. Lassiter's fundamental right to the care and custody of her son. This

cost-benefit analysis has the seductive appearance of objectivity. The most
critical distortion associated with the Eldridge balancing test is that it undervalues core liberty interests which are not easily quantifiable. In this period
of growing budgetary constraints, the Court will be faced with increasing
pressure to determine the level of protection for fundamental rights according to cost-benefit analysis. If these vulnerable "core" liberties are to survive,

the Court must recognize and compensate for the distortions inherent in the
Eldrtdge balancing test.

While holding that Ms. Lassiter's lack of appointed counsel was not a
violation of due process, the Supreme Court stated that in the future such
issues should be resolved by the trial courts on an ad hoc basis, subject to

appellate review. Such a case-by-case approach will undoubtedly increase
the flexibility in determining the requisites of due process, but will also increase the burdens on the trial court. Judges will be forced to evaluate
whether the appointment of counsel would make a determinative difference
before assessing the merits of the case. In the past, an adhoc approach to the
appointment of counsel under the Bells rule created confusion, increased litigation, and was subsequently overruled. 187
Although the Supreme Court has decided there is no per se due process
185. Note, Representation n Child-Neglect Cases: Are Parents Neglected?, 4 COLUM. J. OF LAW &
SoC. PROB. 230, 241-43 (1968). This study indicated that in state initiated proceedings, 79.5%

of the unrepresented parents were adjudicated neglectful and 16.6% of the petitions were either
withdrawn or dismissed; whereas, only 62.5% of the proceedings resulted in findings of neglect
when parents had retained counsel and of this group, 37.5% of the petitions were withdrawn or
dismissed.
186. Note, Child Neglect: Due Process For theParent, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 465, 476 (1970).
187. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overuled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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right to appointed counsel in parental termination proceedings, the corresponding equal protection argument has not been adjudicated. It is likely
the strict scrutiny test would be invoked since termination proceedings affect
a parent's fundamental liberty interest in the integrity of the family. The de
facto, wealth-based classification of parents in termination proceedings
would be deemed unconstitutional unless there was a compelling state justification. Such a justification was not demonstrated in the Lassiter case. Despite the strength of this argument, it should be noted that equal protection
arguments, in general, have not been overwhelmingly successful since
1972.188 However, given the United States Supreme Court's past changes in
emphasis, particularly with respect to fundamental rights, it would be a mistake to ignore or underestimate the potential leverage available to impoverished litigants through the equal protection argument. Nevertheless, for the
present, indigent parents may obtain counsel in termination proceedings
only on a case-by-case basis under the due process analysis of Lassiter.
EPILOGUE

In trying to discern the future ramifications of Lassiter, the subsequent
case of Santosky v. Kramert 89 should be noted. Because the two cases dealt
with different issues, the Santosky Court could not explicitly affirm or overrule Lassiter. Nevertheless, the analysis in Santosky is instructive to the extent
it reflects the United States Supreme Court's attitude towards parental status termination proceedings almost one year after deciding Lassiter.
The Santosky decision makes it more difficult to terminate parental status since it compels the state to meet a more stringent standard of proof. A
New York statute requiring a fair preponderance of the evidence was invalidated; 19° instead, the Court held that, at a minimum, due process necessitates that the state establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
parent-child tie should be permanently severed.191
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Santosky, reiterated many
of the themes he had previously articulated in his dissenting opinion in
Lassiter. The Santosky Court, quoting Mathews v. Eldrdge, stated that "procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth192
finding process as applied to the generahty ofcases, not the rare exception."
In light of this consideration, the Santosky Court refused to accept the Lassiter
case-by-case approach to determining the requisite due process. 93 Utilizing
the Eldridge balancing formula, Justice Blackmun rejected the Lassiter presumption disfavoring the appointment of counsel unless the litigant was
threatened with loss of physical liberty as irrelevant to the issue of the standard of proof. 194
188.

Ste GUNTHER, supra note 146, at 946.

189. 50 U.S.L.W. 4333 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1982).
190. Id. at 4339.
191. Id.

192. Id. at 4336 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)) (emphasis added
in Santosky). Ste notes 126 & 127 supra and accompanying text.
193. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4336.
194. Id. at 4335.
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Unlike the majority in Lassiter, the Santosky Court expressly described
natural parents' custody, care, and manAgement of their children as a fundamental liberty interest.' 9 5 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun, in Santosky, es196
poused the need to go beyond civil labels in assessing due process,
particularly with respect to parental status termination proceedings which
possess many of the characteristics of a criminal trial.' 9 7 He concluded that
greater due process must be accorded in government-initiated proceedings
where an individual is threatened With a sig'nificant deprivation of liberty or
the imposition of a stigma.' 9 8
Lassiter's holding that indigents have no per se right to appointed counsel in parental status termination proceedings has not been overruled by
Santosky. Nevertheless, to the degree the majority in Santosky echoed the
themes previously enunciated by the dissent in Lassiter- albeit in a different
context, the Court appears more receptive to the due process rights of impoverished parents. The Santosky Court's explicit affirmation of parents' fundamental liberty interest in the custody, care, and management of their
children'9 can only strengthen the as yet untried equal protection argument
in favor of the indigent's right to appointed counsel in parental status termination proceedings.
Rayma Skeen
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